ODA is under fire due to many different economic and political factors. Scandals have often been reported concerning the use of ODA. Asian dictatorships have, de facto, received large quantities of Japanese official assistance in the past. For what purpose was the money used? Mass media reported scandals and corruption of former Asian governments, like Marcos in the Philippines, Park in South Korea, Sukarno and Soeharto in Indonesia, etc. There are serious doubts about the use of official assistance provided to other countries also, like China or Peru to mention only two.

Right now, the difficult economic situation in Japan and the policies taken by the present Koizumi government, together with recent scandals concerning the allocation and use of ODA money, like the notorious Suzuki scandal in the official aid provided to Russia and the official spending at the summit of Okinawa have provoked a review of Japan's ODA. The whole Ministry of Foreign Affairs is under scrutiny. It is within this frame that some kind of new and fresh thinking is finally felt.

A practical result of reviewing ODA policies was to select countries like Vietnam, as case studies, to look for new approaches to official development assistance. Since half a year ago, government officials started rounds of discussions with NGOs that are doing development projects in Vietnam. Mr. Ono Kenichi, professor of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, acts as the coordinator of the discussions.

National interest and strategic considerations are one of the backbones of Japan's ODA policies. In the case of Vietnam, the country is the most populous after China and Indonesia in the ASEAN10 Association and the fact that Vietnamese are quite hard workers provides an assurance of success for Japan's official assistance.

 

Nevertheless, NGOs question the content of the concept "national interest", as the Foreign Ministry uses it, and unless a thorough discussion is held on the matter the whole review of ODA crumbles. At present, the government is the only one to decide on programs to be funded and there is no room for responsible citizens to intervene in the allocation of ODA funds. In fact, the ones to profit from ODA are the foreign ministry organizations or officials and Japanese companies involved in development programs. The foreign counterpart, for instance in the case of Vietnam, will just be government organizations.

It is hard to accept that such a system serves the Japanese and the Vietnamese people, thus "national interest" is just limited to keep the status quo. It is true that each country has its own system and Vietnam with its communist regime is very different from the democratic Japanese system. Nevertheless, Japan's official assistance comes from the taxes and financial contributions of the Japanese people, thus it should primarily address the needs of people in Vietnam.

Having this essential matter unresolved, most of the discussion-dialogue at the meetings between NGOs representatives and Japanese officials moved at different levels, with very few points of contact. While the officials based most of their opinions on official statistics, NGOs remained skeptical and questioned the objectivity of the data reflecting on their experiences. This became clear when we came to assess the realities of poverty in the country, especially regarding ethnic minorities, many rural areas, the whole "informal sector", etc.

Japanese ODA claims 'Poverty Reduction Strategy' and a 'humanitarian' dimension. In fact, Japan's ODA has concentrated on building big infrastructure, centered in urban areas to promote economic activities.

The results have been of little involvement in forgotten rural areas and the lack of interest in the lives of the people. Here again, the approach is just from above, not together with the people for whom development is meant to be. NGOs working in Vietnam experience the high degree of peoples' participation when development programs have been planned with them. For instance, vital rural roads, primary schools, clinics, etc. are often built with the cooperation of hundreds of people in the communities, while NGOs provide some financial contributions. To offer just an example, foreign NGOs build primary schools in rural areas for about 130 children for less than 12,000 US dollars. The same work, if is done with ODA funds will cost more than double that price. Besides that, when people voluntarily participate in such projects consider the results as done by themselves, but in the case of ODA programs it was Japan, not themselves, the one that built that road or that dam, etc. From the point of view of real development, people feel confident to improve their lives once they realize their possibilities and power and when they cooperate together.

One of the key criteria to judge how seriously the review of Japan's ODA will be done deals with future cooperation between ODA funds and NGOs programs. Most NGOs working in Vietnam have projects with people living under the poverty line in forgotten rural areas and urban slums. If the government is serious in implementing its policies of poverty alleviation, it could find in the NGOs reliable partners to reach the people who are in need. It is true that the invitation to a discussion dialogue is a step forwards, but the essential matter of official and private cooperation is still only on paper and just for a limited time of a few months. The answer to what 'national interest' means is all connected to a combination of official and private efforts. Right now, the walls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are still quite thick.